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Douglas E. Delaney. The Imperial Army Project: Britain and the 
Land Forces of the Dominions and India, 1902-1945. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018. Pp. 368. 
How does a country build an army? Where do the major influences 
of the process originate? Are the prime motivators money, tradition 
or ease? In The Imperial Army Project: Britain and the Land Forces 
of the Dominions and India, 1902-1945, Douglas Delaney details 
how Britain, the dominions and India shaped their armies in the 
period beginning after the South African War through to the end 
of the Second World War. These constituent parts of the British 
Empire worked together through a period of political change to 
create national armies organised along similar lines.1 
The level of interoperability achieved by the empire’s armies is a 
crucial element of Delaney’s work. He likens the ‘imperial army project’ 
to a military coalition of Lego pieces, different parts that fit together 
to create a cohesive whole yet still allowing the different pieces to 
look unique. This is an apt analogy to describe the British Empire’s 
armies in the first half of the twentieth century. Motivations of the 
different dominions, India, and Britain are explored throughout the 
book. Delaney argues that Britain and the dominions had different 
motivations for participating in this process of army standardisation. 
Britain’s need of imperial sources of manpower drove British interest, 
and the British War Office wanted imperial contingents “that were 
compatible with the British Army, predictable in terms of sizes and 
composition, and willing to take orders from Whitehall” (p. 32). For 
the dominions, Delaney contends that they had to organise their 
armies in some way, so the British Army was a good model as it 
saved money. India was far more reticent to conform to organisational 
standards beginning in the post-South African War period through to 
the period of rearmament in the 1930s. The hesitation was overcome 
by the British financial support to modernise the Indian Army. 
Delaney’s work occupies a unique position in the historiography 
about imperial defence relations. There are numerous other works on 
the development of the individual dominion’s armies or about imperial 
coordination efforts during individual wars, but none have explored 
1  Empire is being used interchangeably with Commonwealth for this review as the 
Indian Army was examined and was not a dominion at any point during the timeline 
of the book.
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the topic in the same method as Delaney. Also, the neglected area of 
inter-imperial military relations is well documented in The Imperial 
Army Project. Delaney highlights that Canadian historian Richard 
Preston wrote about “‘the illusion of an imperial military structure 
and an imperial army.’ This is an exaggeration based more on political 
and constitutional factors than military ones” (p. 163). Delaney 
is correct in his assessment. Politics often are the focus of other 
works on imperial relations while military connections, both personal 
and institutional relationships, receive little attention. Delaney, in 
contrast, gives them a proper examination. As Dominion politicians 
were willing to conform to equipment and training standardisation, 
they refused to give commitments for wartime contingencies prior to 
the outbreak of conflict. In contrast, military leaders throughout the 
empire wanted stronger bonds between the constituent parts during 
peace and war. Delaney highlights that politics was simply one of 
many factors influencing this process.
Delaney has developed a new framework to examine the success 
of imperial cooperation from 1902 to 1945, arguing that this project 
“can hardly be viewed as anything but a success” (p. 305). This 
interpretation is not new within the historiography. In a recent 
example of his work on the British Commonwealth in the Second 
World War, Iain Johnston-White argued the dominions were a critical 
part of the British victory in the war.2 Delaney’s conclusions are not 
new but his approach to the topic certainly is. 
The archival research conducted for this work is impressive. 
Sources were consulted across the British Commonwealth in the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and South 
Africa, a nation whose contribution to the world wars rarely receives 
an in-depth archival examination from non-South African historians. 
In addition, Delaney’s exploration of the historiography of imperial 
relations is a well drafted section of the book. He situates his book 
among the earlier works on the topic and explains how he builds off 
of their findings. Delaney cites John Darwin’s The Empire Project 
as an example of conceptualising the empire ‘system,’ although little 
of that work examines how imperial armies were raised and worked 
2  Iain E. Johnston-White The British Commonwealth and Victory in the Second 
World War, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 7. 
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together. Delaney’s title is a nod to Darwin’s seminal work.3 Richard 
Preston’s Canada and ‘Imperial Defence’ was referred to as a model 
study of imperial relationships through the First World War, while 
historians Andrew Stewart’s and Nicholas Mansergh’s works surveyed 
Britain’s cooperation with the dominions during the Second World 
War.4 Delaney correctly asserts that “no one has adequately tackled 
how soldiers and statesman achieved the level of interoperability 
that the armies of the British Empire exhibited over the extended 
period of the two world wars” (p. 4). The Imperial Army Project has 
successfully fulfilled this void in the historiography.
It is always difficult to decide which elements to exclude when 
writing on the British Empire. Delaney’s choice not to examine 
Ireland, as it was not independent in the First World War and was 
neutral in the Second World War, is a fair one. But the decision to 
omit Newfoundland on the grounds that their wartime contingents 
were never bigger than a regiment or battalion, leads one to question 
if Delaney’s thesis holds true for units smaller than divisions. One 
cannot help thinking that examining Newfoundland’s contribution 
to the world wars would have been an interesting exercise to see 
how far down the chain of command Delaney’s thesis holds true. 
Newfoundland’s omission does not detract from the overall work but 
offers questions as to the extent of the ‘imperial army project.’
The Lego principle of interconnecting pieces was well supported 
with numerous examples. In the First World War, cooperation 
between Canadians and Australians before the battle of Amiens is a 
notable instance of this principle at work. Australian troops briefed 
Canadians about the battlefield’s terrain, gathered intelligence and 
the objectives at Amiens. Canadian participation in the battle 
remained a secret thus they could not scout or man their positions 
ahead of time. An entire corps was slotted into the order of battle 
without major preparation, demonstrating the interconnectedness of 
the empire’s armies. Delaney also notes that during the battle of 
3  John Darwin,  The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World 
System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
4  Richard A. Preston, Canada and ‘Imperial Defence’: A Study of the Origins 
of the British Commonwealth’s Defence Organization, 1967–1919 (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1967); Andrew Stewart, Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions 
and the Second World War (London: Continuum, 2008); and Nicholas Mansergh, A 
Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime Co-operation and 
Post-war Change, 1939–1952 (London: Oxford University Press, 1958).
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Amiens “Imperial artillery knew no national boundaries” (p. 161). 
The Canloan program of the Second World War, where Canadian 
officers served in British regiments is another example of the intra-
empire sharing and cooperation. The program was a reversal of the 
First World War where large numbers of British officers served in 
dominion armies. Whatever form this exchange took, it demonstrated 
the interoperability of the British Empire’s armies.  
Delaney highlights that knowledge did not just flow outwards 
from the British metropole to the dominions. Sharing of information 
went both ways. The Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario 
was the model on which the Australian Royal Military College 
at Duntroon was based upon. This example of an inter-dominion 
exchange was an important element of this imperial process. Also, in 
the mid 1930s Britain created a course on staff duties for Territorial 
Army officers based on the Canadian Militia staff officer course. 
Information sharing benefitted both Britain and the dominions. 
This work is valuable to academics and graduate students alike 
who study the British Empire’s military effort in the twentieth century. 
The focus on the integrated efforts of Britain, the dominions, and 
India are beneficial to those engaged in the study of imperial warfare, 
as previous works only focused on national armies on a broad scale or 
imperial efforts during a conflict. Studies on imperial interwar army 
development will also benefit from consulting this work.
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